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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Is Utah Administrative Code R156-l-502(l) invalid because it conflicts with the 
statutory framework of Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2)? (R. at 80-81) 
2. Is Utah Administrative Code Rl56-1-502(1) invalid as exceeding the scope of the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing's authority to adopt rules? (R. at 81) 
3- Is Utah Administrative Code R156-l-502(l) unconstitutionally vague and overly 
broad? (R.at81) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The questions presented contain issues of constitutionality and law which are 
reviewed for correctness by the Court, giving no deference to the agency's decision. See 
Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 817 P.2d316.317-18 (Utah 1991Ustating 
that Constitutional questions are questions of law reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision); Taylor v. Department of Commerce. 
952 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah Ct App. 1997) (stating, "As a general rule, we review an 
agency's legal conclusions for correctness"). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE 
The pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations whose interpretation 
is of central importance are set forth in their entirety in Appendix A. These include: Utah 
AdministrativeCodeR156-l-502; Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-203; Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7; Utah Const, art. V, § L 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Procedural Posture 
This proceeding involves a petition, filed by the Department of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing ("Division") seeking revocation or suspension of the license of 
Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. to practice in the State of Utah. See Appendix B. The 
Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Division's petition in an Order on Motion to 
Dismiss. See Appendix C. The Division requested agency review, which was granted, 
and in its Order on Review the Department of Commerce reversed the Order on Motion 
to Dismiss issued by the Administrative Law Judge, See Appendix D. The case is 
brought to this Court on appeal from the Department of Commerce Order on Review,. 
II Statement of Facts 
1. In February 1997, Dr. Weitzel surrendered his California license to practice 
medicine during the pendency of an administrative investigation or inquiry. (R. at 85) 
2. The underlying accusations of the administrative investigation were never proven 
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before the state's licensing authority. (R. at 85) 
3. On April 29,1999, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
(Division) filed a petition against Dr. Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. seeking revocation or 
suspension of Dr. WeitzePs license to practice as a physician in the State of Utah. (R. at 
401-404) 
4. The Division claims that because Dr. Weitzel surrendered his California license 
while an investigation or inquiry into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct 
was pending in California, Dr. Weitzel engaged in unprofessional conduct and is 
therefore subject to disciplinary action. (R. at 403-404) 
5. The Division relies on a definition of unprofessional conduct set forth in Utah 
Admin. Code R156-l-502(l). (R. at 403) 
6. Dr. Weitzel filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and supporting 
memorandum on August 20,1999, and oral argument was conducted on November 8, 
1999. (R. at 80-100,173-222) 
7. Dr. WeitzeFs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was based on the following: 
a. The rale under which the Division seeks disciplinary action, Utah 
Admin. Code R156-l-502(l), exceeds the scope of the Division's rule making authority 
as delegated by the Utah Legislature. (R. at 81,97-99) 
b. Utah Admin, Code R156-l-502(l) is inconsistent with the State 
Legislature's definition of unprofessional conduct found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501. 
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(R. at 80-81, 87-93) 
c. Utah Admin. Code Rl 56-1 -502( 1) is unconstitutionally vague and 
overly broad. (R. at 81, 93-97) 
8. On November 23,1999, the case was dismissed with prejudice by J. Steven 
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, in the Order on Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 130-149) 
9- The Division requested agency review of the Order on December 23,1999. (R. at 
150) 
10. Review was granted and an Order on Review was issued by Douglas C. Borba, 
Executive Director, Utah Department of Commerce on May 16,2000, whereby the Order 
on Motion to Dismiss was reversed and remanded to the Division for further proceedings. 
(R. at 13) 
11. Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Department of Commerce ruled on 
the constitutionality of R156-1-502. (R. at 1-2,133) 
12. On June 15,2000, Dr. Weitzel filed a Petition for Review of the Utah Department 
of Commerce Order on Review with this Court. See Appendix E. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Division seeks revocation or suspension of Dr. WeitzePs license to practice in 
the State of Utah based on an invalid definition of unprofessional conduct set forth in 
Utah Admin. Code R156-l-502(l). Contrary to the statutory framework defining 
unprofessional conduct, R156-l-502(l) includes in the definition of unprofessional 
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conduct not only misconduct but also inaction and conduct which is, in itself, both legal 
and constitutionally protected. In this respect, Rl 56-1-502(1) is inconsistent with the 
statutory framework and thus invalid. 
Because R156-l-502(l) deviates from the legislative intent evidence by Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-1-501, it fails to give adequate notice to those familiar with the purpose 
and objective of the statutory provisions and is thus unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, 
R156-1-502(1) is overly broad on its face and in its application because it purports to 
punish inaction and otherwise lawful activity. The rule infringes on a licensee's 
fundamental right to travel as well as his constitutionally protected freedom of 
expression. It further infringes on a licensee's due process rights by punishing the 
licensee for mere allegations and accusations, even if unproven. The State has no 
interest in precluding from practice an otherwise qualified licensee merely because the 
licensee faces unproven accusations, and the rule which infringes fundamental rights is 
therefore unconstitutional 
In deviating from the statutory framework and expending the definition of 
unprofessional conduct to include otherwise lawful conduct, the Division exceeded the 
scope of its authority to adopt regulations. The addition does not constitute 
supplementation of the statutory definition of unprofessional conduct but rather enlarges 
flie definition. Because the Division is part of the executive branch and thus has no 
legislative authority to enlarge or modify State statutes, R156-l-502(l) is invalid. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R156-l-502(l) IS INVALID BECAUSE 
IT CONFLICTS WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501 
Utah law has always recognized the authority of an administrative agency to 
define and interpret the law, when such definitions and interpretations are adopted by the 
agency pursuant to a statutory grant of authority. See Horton v. Utah State Retirement 
BdL, 842 P.2d 928, 932 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Indeed, when an agency adopts rules 
and regulations pursuant to the directives of the Legislature, such rules and regulations 
have the full force and effect of law. See id Much like a legislative amendment that 
clarifies ambiguous terms in a statute, an administrative rule may be used to interpret 
ambiguous statutory provisions. See V-l Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, Pi v. 
Of Envtl. Response and Remediation. 904 P.2d 214,219 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
However, it is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's 
rules must be consistent with its governing statutes. See Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit 
Diy,, 846 P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1993); Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt. 912 P.2d 961, 
965 (Utah 1996). To this end, agency regulations may not abridge, enlarge, extend or 
modify the statute creating the right or imposing the duty. See Ferro v. Utah Dep't of 
Comm.. Div. Of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 507,515 n.7 (Utah 
Ct App. 1992). When an administrative rule is out of harmony or in conflict with the 
express provisions of a statute, the rule would in effect amend that statute, and is 
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therefore invalid. See Eaton Kenwav v. Auditing Division, 906 P.2d 882, 885-86 (Utah 
1995); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Pi v. of State Lands & Forestry. 886 P.2d 514, 532 
(Utah 1994) (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). 
In this case, Dr. Weitzel does not challenge the Division's ability to enact rules 
further defining the term "unprofessional conduct" See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-203(5) 
(1998); Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2). However, the substance of the definition of 
"unprofessional conduct" at issue in this case is inconsistent and out of harmony with the 
statutory framework and is therefore invalid. Since Utah Admin. Code Rl56-1-502(1) is 
inconsistent with its governing statute, the rule cannot provide the basis for disciplinary 
action sought by the Division in this matter. 
The Division relies on two definitions of "unprofessional conduct," one of which 
is defined statutorily by the Legislature and the other which was adopted by the Division 
itself. The statutory definition defines unprofessional conduct as: 
engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action, 
including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, 
suspension, or revocation, by any other licensing or 
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or 
applicant in the same occupation or profession if the conduct 
would, in this state, constitute grounds for denial of licensure 
or disciplinary proceedings under Section 58-1-401; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(d)(1998). Under the plain language of this definition as 
well as the other ten definitions of unprofessional conduct contained in Utah Code Ann. § 
58-1-501(2), determination of unprofessional conduct requires some affirmative act on 
behalf of a professional licensee. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2) (designating eleven 
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distinct categories of affirmative conduct as unprofessional conduct). The Division's 
definition, on the other hand, defines unprofessional conduct as 
surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory 
authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in 
the same occupation or profession while an investigation or 
inquiry into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct 
is in progress or after a charging document has been filed 
against the applicant or licensee alleging unprofessional or 
unlawful conduct;... 
Utah Admin. Code R156-l-502(l) (1996). 
The Division's definition in Rl56-1-502(1), particularly as applied in the present 
case, would permit disciplinary action as a result of inaction, i.e. failing to defend against 
unsubstantiated accusations generated in another state, and is thus wholly inconsistent 
with the statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature in subdivision (2) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-1-501 which is set forth in its entirety in Appendix A. The eleven statutory 
definitions of unprofessional conduct in Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501 demonstrate that in 
order to engage in unprofessional conduct, a licensed professional must engage in 
wrongful conduct or conduct which reflects adversely on the licensee's ability to practice 
his or her profession, which has been finally determined by a court of law, an 
administrative agency, or other fact finding body. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2). 
A careful reading of § 58-1-501(2) reveals a framework of unprofessional conduct 
which involves some kind of misconduct, as well as the implication that the person has 
been adjudged or found, by competent proof, of actually engaging in such misconduct. 
For example, subdivision (2)(d), which appears to be relied on by tKe*St£teras the 
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statutory counterpart of R156-1-502(1), requires that the licensee (1) engage in some 
kind of conduct, and (2) that conduct subjects him or her to reprimand, censure, 
diversion, probation, suspension, or revocation, by another licensing authority. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(d). By its terms, subdivision (2)(d) requires misconduct which 
results in a disciplinary action by another licensing authority. This necessarily implies 
that th licensee must be found, by reliable evidence, to have engaged in wrongful 
conduct. 
Now compare the regulatory definition of unprofessional conduct found in R156-
1-502(1). According to the Division, all that is required in order to be guilty of 
unprofessional conduct is a finding that the licensed professional simply surrendered his 
license to a licensing authority in another State after accusations of professional 
incompetence or unlawful conduct had been filed. Unlike the statutory framework, the 
Divisions' definition impermissibly allows a finding of unprofessional conduct by mere 
innuendo, without any findings of fact being entered as to the truthfulness of the filed 
accusations. This runs directly counter to the well-established principle of American 
jurisprudence that penalties and liabilities are allowed to be imposed only after it is made 
clear by competent proof that the law has been violated, and where a finding to that effect 
has been made. See Moorehouse v. Hammond. 60 Utah 593,209 P. 883, 885 (1922). 
Regardless of the licensee's reasons for surrendering his license, the Division 
would hold a licensed professional strictly liable for engaging in the relatively simple and 
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harmless act of surrendering his license.1 Unlike the statutory framework, the Division's 
definition allows a finding of unprofessional conduct when there has been no misconduct 
on the part of the licensee. Certainly the innocuous act of voluntarily surrendering a 
professional license could not be considered misconduct. Rather, it appears that the 
Division seeks to punish the unproven accusations originated in another state.2 Thus, it is 
completely unlike the other definitions of unprofessional conduct set forth by the 
Legislature. The eleven listed practices in the statutory framework all relate to some 
misconduct on the part of the licensee, and presuppose a finding by an adjudicative body 
or other tribunal that the licensee acted improperly, illegally, or incompetently. The 
regulatory framework, on the other hand, attaches liability for unprofessional conduct to 
conduct which is neither wrongful, improper, illegal nor incompetent. While the 
statutory framework would punish conduct that reflects adversely on the practice of a 
profession and only after a determination of guilt has been made, the regulatory 
!The reasons for surrendering a license should be relevant in making a 
determination as to whether the surrender of the license constitutes "unprofessional 
conduct." For instance, it should be relevant to consider whether the licensee had a 
practice in the state in which surrender took place, or whether only a very small portion 
of his practice occurred there. It should also be relevant to a determination of 
unprofessional conduct under the regulatory definition to determine the licensee's 
financial ability to folly defend accusations. Other relevant reasons for surrendering a 
license might also include not wanting to pay the periodic registration fee for licensure or 
incur the financial obligations involved with continuing medical education or other 
financial obligations that are required of a current license holder. 
2The Division went so far as to include with its original petition the underlying 
"Accusation" filed in CasemiO-95-57008 before the California medical board. (R at 
413) 
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framework punishes completely innocuous conduct that does not negatively reflect on the 
licensee's ability to practice his chosen profession.3 
The Latin phrase ejusdem generis, or "of the same kind," is particularly instructive 
to his case. This doctrine of statutory construction means that general terms in a rule or 
statute must be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense analogous to those specific 
terms which follow or precede it. See State v. Vogt 824 P.2d 455,458 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). The general term in this case is "unprofessional conduct." Under the statute, 
there are eleven specific terms which follow the general term, all of which indicate the 
policy of preventing licensed professionals from practicing their profession if they 
engage in misconduct which reflects adversely on their ability to practice medicine. The 
regulatory definition under R156-1-502(1) odes not follow suit Unlike the statutory 
definitions, the regulatory definition ignores the requirement that the licensed 
professional engage in misconduct, that the misconduct reflect adversely on the 
professional's ability to practice his profession, and that there be a finding of misconduct, 
3By allowing the Division to make a finding of unprofessional conduct by 
innuendo, and to punish a doctor for surrendering his license in another state, an act 
which is neither wrongful nor reflective of the doctor's ability to render quality medical 
treatment, there is no limit or restriction as to what the Division may next choose to make 
unprofessional conduct under its regulations. Indeed, nothing would prevent the Division 
from defining unprofessional conduct as including the voluntary declination to accept a 
position on a hospital's mortality review committee after an investigation by law 
enforcement into the sudden and unexpected death of a doctor's wife, or the voluntary 
cancellation by a doctor of his subscription to the Journal of the American Medical 
Association and subscribing in its place to Guns & Ammo. These examples demonstrate 
the injustice served by Rl 56-1-502(1) and the ability of the Division imder Jiafciiiieto 
allow a finding of unprofessional conduct by innuendo. 
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not by innuendo, but rather through competent proof. As a result, Rl 56-1-502(1) is 
invalid. 
n . UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R156-l-502(l) IS UNCONSTI-
TUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERLY BROAD 
Because a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions that the 
Division's regulations are meant to achieve, does not have fair warning of what the 
regulation requires or prohibits, Rl 56-1-502(1) is unconstitutionally vague. The rule is 
also unconstitutionally broad, on its face, to the extent that it seeks to prohibit legal and 
constitutionally protected rights of a licensed professional Moreover, the rule is 
unconstitutional in its application to Dr. Weitzel because it violates Dr. WeitzeFs right to 
engage in free expression and to defend himself against allegations consistent with due 
process of law. The rule further impinges on Dr. WeitzeFs constitutionally recognized 
property interest in his license to practice medicine. See Keney v. Derbyshire. 718 F.2d 
352, 354 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating, "A license to practice medicine is a property right 
deserving of constitutional protection, including due process"); see also Clayton v. 
Bennett. 5 Utah 2d 152,155,298 P.2d 531,533 (Utah 1956) (agreeing "that the right la 
engage in a profession is a property right which is entitled to protection by the law and 
the courts"). 
A. Utah Admin. Code R156-l-502(l) Is Unconstitutionally Vague 
In Utah, questions regarding vagueness of a statute or rule are essentially 
procedural due process issues. See State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,191-92 (Utah 
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1987). To satisfy the ends of due process, regulations must be sufficiently specific to 
give regulated parties adequate notice of the conduct they require or prohibit. See 
Freemen United Coal Mining Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review. 108 F.3d 
358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1997). While a particular rule need not provide mathematical 
certainty or meticulous specificity, a regulation must be sufficiently specific that a 
reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to 
address and the objectives the regulations are meant to achieve, would have fair warning 
of what the regulations require. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor. 951 
F.2d 292, 295 n. 11 (10th Cir. 1991). 
The regulation at issue in this case fails to give fair notice to a person familiar with 
the conditions the regulation is meant to address and the objectives the regulation is 
meant to achieve. In the case of Utah's licensing statutes, the purpose behind such laws 
is to protect the public against those persons who are not qualified by training and 
experience to render successfully and efficiently the services they offer to perform for 
compensation. See Smith v. American Packing & Provision Co.. 102 Utah 351,130 P.2d 
951 (1942). It necessarily follows that the objectives of the Division in regulating the 
practice of medicine, along with the other licensed professions, mirrors the legislative 
purpose. However, R156-l-502(l) is not consistent with this purpose or policy of the 
State. By defining unprofessional conduct as the surrendering of a professional license, 
after a charging document is filed, and without requiring any determination on the 
charges, R156-l-502(l) does not protect the public against unqualified practitioners but 
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rather purports to prevent an otherwise qualified professional from practicing because he 
is accused, even if wrongfully so, of being unqualified. 
A person reasonably familiar with the State's objectives could not possibly know 
that by simply surrendering his license in lieu of spending thousands of dollars to defend 
against charges in a state where he neither resides nor practices would constitute 
unprofessional conduct The Utah Constitution and United States Constitution require 
fair notice of prohibited conduct which is not provided by a definition of unprofessional 
conduct that contravenes the State's licensing objectives by purporting to prevent a 
professional from practicing because of mere accusations. See Utah Const, art. 1, § 7; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
B. Utah Administrative Code R156-l-502(l) Is Unconstitutionally 
Overbroad 
The rule at issue is overly broad because it prohibits constitutionally protected 
behavior as well as unprotected behavior. See Frampton, 737 P.2d at 192. As applied to 
Dr. Weitzel, Rl 56-1-502(1) would force him to spend thousands of dollars and appear in 
California to defend against baseless claims of unprofessional conduct and incompetency 
This infringes upon Dr. Weitzel's constitutionally protected right to travel as well as his 
constitutionally protected right to free expression. In effect, the rule attempts to force Dr. 
Weitzel to defend against factually unsupported accusations which he has a 
constitutionally protected right not to address, and to remain in California despite his 
constitutionally protected right to travel. 
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Any professional may choose to maintain licenses in any number of states. On its 
face, Rl56-1-502(1) prevents a licensed professional from choosing to practice in the 
State of Utah if any allegations, no matter how baseless or lacking in factual support and 
regardless of whether the professional is in fact fit to practice, are initiated in any state 
where the professional maintains a license if the professional chooses to surrender his 
license rather than return to or stay in a state where he never intended to practice again 
anyway. In a substantive due process context, R156-l-502(l) imposes an arbitrary and 
capricious restriction on the professional's ability to practice in Utah, without regard to 
legitimate state policies. 
While Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501 serves the legitimate purpose of preventing 
unqualified and unfit persons from practicing medicine within the state, R156-1-502(1), 
as demonstrated above, goes beyond this objective and outlaws purely legal and 
constitutionally protected activity. Accordingly, Rl56-1-502(1) is unconstitutional on its 
face and as applied to Dr. Weitzel. 
III. THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
LICENSING EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY ADOPTING UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R156-l-502(l) WHICH ENLARGES THE SCOPE OF 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 58-1-501(2) 
The powers and functions of State government are set forth in Utah's Constitution, 
Article V, § 1 which divides duties among the three separate branches of government. 
See Utah const, art. V, § 1. The legislative function has long included the "enactment of 
laws, that is, the creation of legal rights, liabilities, and remedies." See Mulcahv v. 
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Public Serv. Comm'n. 117 P.2d 298,302 (Utah 1941). The executive function, on the 
other hand, of which the State agencies are a part, is to "carry into effect, to put into 
operation and operate, the legislative mandates." Id. at 302. "It acts to perform the 
duties, the obligations, imposed upon the public body by law, and to see that the 
individuals duly render and perform the obligations and duties which the law has said 
they owe to the public body or the government." Id. To this end, the executive 
department through its various agencies, has the authority to enact rules and regulations 
to interpret or further define conduct that is proscribed by the Legislature. In so doing, 
however, the executive department may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a] 
statute creating the right or imposing the duty." IML Freight. Inc. v. Ottosen. 538 P.2d 
296, 297 (Utah 1975). 
The Division has violated these well-established constitutional principles by 
enacting Rl 56-1-502(1). The agency's definition of unprofessional conduct enlarges the 
scope of unprofessional conduct as that term has already been defined by the Legislature. 
By including the simple act of surrendering a license to another licencing authority in its 
definition of "unprofessional conduct," the Division has impermissibly altered and 
enlarged the type of conduct prohibited by statute. Because the Legislature has only 
authorized the Division to define unprofessional conduct so as to supplement the 
statutory definition, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-203(5) (1998), the Division has 
overstepped its authority by expanding the statutory list of affirmative misconduct that 
constitutes unprofessional conduct to include voluntary inactions, acts which are not, in 
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and of themselves, wrongful, and by purporting to punish professionals based on mere 
unproven accusations. By doing so, the Division assumed those duties and functions that 
can only be performed by a completely separate branch of State government. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. respectfully 
requests that the Order on Review be reversed and that this action be dismissed in its 
entirety. 
DATED this 10 day of September, 2000. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
By: 2 ^ ^ ^ 
PETER STIRBA 
D ARIEN ALCORN 
Attorneys for Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. 
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5/5&; I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this/C*-3ay of September, 2000,1 caused to be 
served a true copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF and APPENDICES, by 
the method indicated below, to the following: 
Elizabeth A. Bowman 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872 
J^fU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
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C:\MyFiles\WeitzeI\Licensing Appeal\Appellate Brief, wpd 
Tab A 
APPENDIX A - CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE 
Utah Administrative Code 
Utah Administrative Code R156-1-502. Unprofessional Conduct. 
"Unprofessional conduct" includes: 
(1) surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory authority having 
jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation or profession while an 
investigation or inquiry into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in 
progress or after a charging document has been filed against the applicant or licensee 
alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct; 
(2) practicing a regulated occupation or profession in, through, or with a limited 
liability company which has omitted the words "limited company," "limited liability 
company," or the abbreviation "L.C." or "L.L.C." in the commercial use of the name of 
the limited liability company; 
(3) practicing a regulated occupation or profession in, through, or with a limited 
partnership which has omitted the words "limited partnership," "limited," or the 
abbreviation "L.P." or "Ltd." in the commercial use of the name of the limited 
partnership; or 
(4) practicing a regulated occupation or profession in, through, or with a 
professional corporation which has omitted the words "professional corporation" or the 
abbreviation "P.C." in the commercial use of the name of the professional corporation. 
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Utah Code Annotated 
Utah Code Ann. §58-1-203. Duties, functions, and responsibilities of division in 
collaboration with board 
The following duties, functions, and responsibilities of the division shall be 
performed by the division with the collaboration and assistance of the appropriate board: 
(1) defining which schools, colleges, universities, departments of universities, or 
other institutions of learning are reputable and in good standing with the division; 
(2) prescribing license qualifications; 
(3) prescribing rules governing applications for licenses; 
(4) providing for a fair and impartial method of examination of applicants; 
(5) defining unprofessional conduct, by rule, to supplement the definitions under 
this chapter or other licensing chapters; 
(6) establishing advisory peer committees to the board and prescribing their scope 
of authority; and 
(7) establishing conditions for reinstatement and renewal of licenses. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501. Unlawful and unprofessional conduct 
(1) "Unlawful conduct" means conduct, by any person, that is defined as unlawful 
under this title and includes: 
(a) practicing or engaging in, representing oneself to be practicing or engaging in, 
or attempting to practice or engage in any occupation or profession requiring licensure 
under this title if the person is: 
(i) not licensed to do so or not exempted from licensure under this title; or 
(ii) restricted from doing so by a suspended, revoked, restricted, temporary, 
probationary, or inactive license; 
(b) impersonating another licensee or practicing an occupation or profession under 
a false or assumed name, except as permitted by law; 
(c) knowingly employing any other person to practice or engage in or attempt to 
practice or engage in any occupation or profession licensed under this title if the 
employee is not licensed to do so under this title; 
(d) knowingly permitting the person's authority to practice or engage in any 
occupation or profession licensed under this title to be used by another, except as 
permitted by law; or 
(e) obtaining a passing score on a licensure examination, applying for or obtaining 
a license, or otherwise dealing with the division or a licensing board through the use of 
fraud, forgery, or intentional deception, misrepresentation, misstatement, or omission. 
(2) "Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or applicant, that is 
defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule adopted under this 
title and includes: 
(a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any statute, rule, or 
order regulating an occupation or profession under this title; 
(b) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any generally 
accepted professional or ethical standard applicable to an occupation or profession 
regulated under this title; 
(c) engaging in conduct that results in conviction of, or a plea of nolo contendere 
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to, a crime of moral turpitude or any other crime that, when considered with the functions 
and duties of the occupation or profession for which the license was issued or is to be 
issued, bears a reasonable relationship to the licensee's or applicant's ability to safely or 
competently practice the occupation or profession; 
(d) engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action, including reprimand, 
censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or revocation, by any other licensing or 
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same 
occupation or profession if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds for denial 
of licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section 58-1-401; 
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use of intoxicants, drugs, narcotics, or 
similar chemicals, to the extent that the conduct does, or might reasonably be considered 
to, impair the ability of the licensee or applicant to safely engage in the occupation or 
profession; 
(f) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under 
this title despite being physically or mentally unfit to do so; 
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated 
under this title through gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a pattern of 
incompetency or negligence; 
(h) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession requiring 
licensure under this title by any form of action or communication which is false, 
misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent; 
(i) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under 
this title beyond the scope of the licensee's competency, abilities, or education; 
(j) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under 
this title beyond the scope of the licensee's license; or 
(k) verbally, physically, mentally, or sexually abusing or exploiting any person 
through conduct connected with the licensee's practice under this title or otherwise 
facilitated by the licensee's license. 
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Constitutional Provisions 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section I 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three 
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall 
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
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APPENDIX B - PETITION 
DOPL CASE NO. 99-71 
iWjgiiiWffr 
APR 2 9 1S99 
SI DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 Dl V:? .'ON OF OCCUPATIONAL 
Telephone: (801) 366-0310 & PnG.-ESSlOriAL LICENSING 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL 
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
ROBERT A. WEITZEL, M.D. TO 
PRACTICE MEDICINE IN THE STATE 
OF UTAH AND TO PRESCRIBE AND 
ADMINISTER CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES 
PETITION 
DOPL CASE No. 99 -71 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These claims were investigated by the DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING ("Division") upon complaint that ROBERTA. WEITZEL, 
M.D. ("Respondent"), has engaged in acts and practices which constitute violations of 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-1-
101 to 58-1-504 (1998). 
PARTIES 
1. The Division is a Division of the Department of Commerce of the State of 
Utah and is established by virtue of UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1-2 (1992). 
2. Respondent is licensed by the Division under the Medical Practice Act to 
practice medicine. He was so licensed at all times material to the allegations contained 
herein. 
A * ( 
STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 
3. Respondent is currently licensed and at all times relevant to this 
proceeding has been licensed to practice as a physician/surgeon in the State of Utah 
and was formerly also licensed to so practice in the State of California. 
4. On or about March 27,1997, the Division of Medical Quality of the 
Medical Board of California adopted a Stipulation for Surrender of License signed 
earlier by Respondent, and accepted Respondent's surrender of his Physician's and 
Surgeon's certificate. That surrender occurred after a charging document was filed 
against Respondent by the Board stemming from allegations that Respondent had 
engaged in professional incompetency, gross negligence, unprofessional conduct and 
sexual misconduct and is incorporated herein by reference. See: attached Stipulation 
for Surrender of License. Exhibit A. 
LICENSE DENIAL AND DISCIPLINE 
5 The Division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant and may refuse 
to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, assess an administrative 
penalty, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any 
licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined 
by statute or rule under this title. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-401 (1998)1 
1
 This statute is unchanged from its 1993 version except for a statute of 
limitations provision found in subsection (5), which is not at issue in this case. 
2 
6. "Unprofessional conduct" includes but is not limited to: 
(a) Statutory definition: 
engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action, including 
reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, suspension or revocation, 
by any other licensing or regulatory authority having jurisdiction 
over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation or profession 
if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds for denial of 
licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section 58-1-401;. . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-501 (2)(d)(1998)2 
(b) Rule definition: 
surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory authority 
having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same 
occupation or profession while an investigation or inquiry into 
allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in progress or 
after a charging document has been filed against the applicant or 
licensee alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct;... 
UTAH ADMIN. R. 156-1-502 (1) (1996) 
COUNT 1 
LICENSE SURRENDER IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION 
7. Paragraphs 1 through 6 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated 
herein. 
8. Because Respondent surrendered his Physicians and Surgeon's 
Certificate to practice medicine in the State of California after a charging document was 
filed against Respondent by the Medical Board of California stemming from allegations 
that Respondent had engaged in professional incompetency, gross negligence, 
This statute is unchanged from its 1993 version. 
3 
/ l i \1 
unprofessional conduct and sexual misconduct, Respondent has engaged in 
unprofessional conduct, constituting grounds for sanctioning Respondent's license as 
provided under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1 -401 -(2)(a)(1996). 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. that Respondent be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in the acts 
alleged herein; 
2. that by engaging in the above acts, Respondent be adjudged and decreed 
to have violated the enumerated provisions of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing Act; 
3. that an Order be issued revoking or suspending the license of 
Respondent to practice as a physician in accordance with the provisions of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-1-401(2)(a)(1998). 
DATED this c^9^A day of /sL^a^t^L-. , 1999. 
a ^O yC ^ 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
Department of Commerce 
;£kiadfcJZ_ 
APPROVED. FOR FILING 
distant ^ttorne)(/6e*neral 
4 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the o ^ V ^ f d a y of /^L^L\^t^Jt^ 1999, personally appeared before 
me Irene Gayheart, and after being duly sworn, deposes and says; that she has read 
the foregoing Petition and knows the contents thereof; and the same is true to the best 
of her knowledge except as to matters stated on information and belief, and that as to 
those matters she believes it to be true. 
•^Jf l^*^ ^ -*Jr4~&^tC^ 
Investigator 
Division of Occupational & Professional 
Licensing 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this \)\ 
1999. 
day of. m_ 
"TKyfARY PUBLIC CAROL WYINQ^SBY 
cJfelONEXMRESl 
CTATE OF UTAH, 
My Commission Expires: 
vn-MKii 
m.. n muitim 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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40U 
BEFORE THE 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of 
Against: 
ROBERT WEITZEL, 
Certificate No, 
the Accusation ) 
M.D. ) 
. A-48888 ) 
Respondent. ) 
No. 10-95-57008 
PECISION 
The a t t a c h e d S t i p u l a t i o n f o r Surrender o f L i c e n s e 
i n c a s e number 1 0 - 9 5 - 5 7 0 0 8 i s hereby adopted by t h e D i v i s i o n 
of Medical Q u a l i t y o f t h e Medical Board o f C a l i f o r n i a a s i t s 
d e c i s i o n i n t h e above e n t i t l e d matter* 
Thi s D e c i s i o n s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e on March 27, 1997 
IT IS SO ORDERED March 27
 y 1997 % 
* • • Or CALIFORNIA 
• . - •. :/ mar 
•'--: en fi!o in this 
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALTY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
o.'.vi... 
UL 
'UGhEO (/ DATE 
By A L 
ANABEL ANDERSON IMBERT, M.D. 
President 
UKIb'INAL 
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
of t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a 
THOMAS S. LAZAR, 
Deputy A t t o r n e y Genera l 
S t a t e Bar No.- 120621 
Depar tmen t of J u s t i c e 
P . O . Box 85266 
San Diego , CA 92186-5266 
T e l e p h o n e : (619) 645-2117 
A t t o r n e y s f o r Complainant 
BEFORE THE 
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALD70RNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
I n t h e M a t t e r of t h e A c c u s a t i o n } Case No. 10 -95 -57008 
A g a i n s t : ) 
) OAH No. L-9611250 
ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. ) 
4052 West P i o n e e r Park Way } 
S u i t e 201 ) STIPULATION FOR 
West V a l l e y C e n t e r , Utah 84120 ) SURRENDER OF LICENSUR 
P h y s i c i a n ' s and S u r g e o n ' s ) 
C e r t i f i c a t e No. A 48888, ) 
R e s p o n d e n t . ) 
IT IS HEREBY STTPULATED AND AGREED by and be tween t h 
p a r t i e s to the above-enti t led proceedings tha t the following 
matters are t r u e : 
1. Complainant Ron Joseph i s the Executive Directo 
of the Medical Board of Cal i forn ia , Department of Consumer 
Affairs ("Board") and i s represented by Daniel E. Lungren, 
Attorney General of the S ta te of California, by Thomas S. Laze 
Deputy Attorney General. 
/ / 
1 . 
AM. 
1 2. Robert Weitzel, M.D. ("respondent"), is 
2 represented by attorney Bruce E. Sulzner, Esq., SULZNER & 
3 ASSOCIATES, whose address is 402 West Broadway, Suite 810, San 
4 Diego, CA 92101. Respondent has discussed the effects of this 
5 Stipulation with his attorney, and respondent has carefully rea 
6 and fully understands this Stipulation. 
7 3. Respondent has received and read the Accusation 
8 which is presently on file and pending in Case No. 10-95-57008, 
9 j! before the Division of Medical Quality of the Board ("Division* 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated here: 
by reference as if fully set forth herein. 
4. Respondent understands the nature of the charge: 
alleged in the Accusation and that, if proven at hearing, such 
charges and allegations would constitute cause for imposing 
discipline upon respondent's license issued by the Board. 
5. Respondent and his counsel are aware of each of 
respondent's rights, including the right to a hearing on the 
charges and allegations, the right to confront and cross-exami 
witnesses who would testify against respondent, the right to 
testify and present evidence on his own-behalf, as well as th* 
right to the issuance of subpoenas to compel the attendance oi 
witnesses and the production of documents, the right to contei 
the charges and allegations, and other rights which are accor 
respondent pursuant to the California Administrative Procedur 
Act (Gov. Code, §§ 11500, et seq.) and other applicable laws, 
including the right to seek reconsideration, review by the-
superior court, and appellate review. 
2. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
6 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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6. For the purpose of resolving Accusation No. 10-95 
57008, respondent hereby gives up his right to contest that caus 
for discipline exists based on those charges and agrees to 
surrender of his Physician's and Surgeon's license for the 
Division's formal acceptance. 
7. Respondent understands that by signing this 
Stipulation he is enabling the Division to issue its order 
accepting the surrender of his license without further process. 
He understands and agrees that Board staff and counsel for 
complainant may communicate directly with the Division regardinc 
this Stipulation, without notice to or participation by 
J respondent or his counsel. In the event that this Stipulation i 
rejected for any reason by the Division, it will be of no force 
or effect for either party. The Division will not be 
disqualified from further action in this matter by virtue of it* 
consideration of this Stipulation. 
8. Upon acceptance of this Stipulation by the 
Division, respondent understands that he will no longer be 
permitted to practice as a physician or surgeon in California, 
and also agrees to surrender and cause to be delivered to-the 
Division both his license and wallet certificate before the 
effective date of the Decision. 
9. Respondent fully understands and agrees that if 
ever files an application for relicensure or reinstatement in t 
State of California, the Division shall treat it as a petition 
for reinstatement, and respondent must comply with all the laws 
regulations and procedures for reinstatement of a revoked licer 
4(0 
1 || in effect at the time the petition is filed, and all of the 
2 |] charges and allegations contained in Accusation No. 10-95-57008 
3 will be deemed to be true, correct and admitted by respondent 
4 when the Division determines whether to grant or deny the 
5 petition. 
6 10. Respondent fully understands and agrees that he 
7 will reimburse the Division the amount of $2,300.00 as the cost 
8 of investigation and prosecution of this matter. Respondent 
9 I understands and agrees that a certified check in the amount of 
10 $2,300.00, made payable to the Medical Board of California, mus 
11 be tendered along with this Stipulation, which must be execute( 
12 by both respondent and his counsel, before this Stipulation wi 
13 be considered by the Division. Failure to tender the certifie 
14 i check, as described above, along with the fully executed 
15 Stipulation shall render this Stipulation null and void. If t 
16 Stipulation is not adopted by the Division for any reason, sue 
17 reimbursement will be returned to respondent. 
1 8 II 11. All admissions and recitals contained in this 
19 stipulation are made solely for the purpose of settlement in t 
20 proceeding and for any other proceedings in which the Divisio: 
21 other professional licensing agency is involved, and shall no 
22 admissible in any other criminal or civil proceedings. 
23 ACCEPTANCE 
24 jl I, Robert Weitzel, M.D., have carefully read the ah 
25* stipulation and enter into it freely and voluntarily with the 
26 advice of counsel, and with full knowledge of its force and 
27 effect, do hereby surrender my Physician's and Surgeon's 
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Certificate No. A 48888 to the Division for its formal 
acceptance. By signing this Stipulation to surrender my license 
I recognize that upon its formal acceptance by the Division, I 
will lose all rights and privileges to practice as a physician 
and surgeon in the State of California and I also will cause to 
be delivered' to the Division both my license and wallet 
certificate before the effective date of the Decision. 
DATED: AJ / *•( /<? 1 . 
Rotfeft Wei/£zel, M.D. 
Respondent 
I concur in the stipulation 
DATED: 
DATED : (W/yw-M^ 17. M 1 
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General 
of the State of California 
I I % M S I fc^—^ 
Thomas S. Lazar/\ 
Deputy Attorney^eineral 
Attorneys for Complainant 
5. 
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DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General A'.*r?iCA? r>C-A~r» y^
 n . 
r>f HIP Chstp of California . ~~"~- - * '••<•-' *.=.- CA of the State of California , ~~'7"~. '' w. '**!/ ^UFORNJ, 
M. GAYLE ASKREN, [State Bar No. 52189 t " v V "',*er'"-' c,[-s >V rho-
Deputy Attorney General '••''* f - ' , - : * . • * \~ f.\.:.r 
Department of Justice 
110 West A Street, Suite 1100 
Post Office Box 85266 
San Diego, California 92186-5266 
Telephone: (619) 645-2087 
CK\.-.i OC—.wl. ;-. ... 
Q4 
o? ihc-
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Attorneys for Complainant DATE 
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BEFORE THE 
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation 
Against: 
ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. 
4052 W. Pioneer Park Way, Ste. 201 
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A C C U S A T I O N 
Complainant RON JOSEPH, as cause for disciplinary 
action, alleges: 
PARTIES 
1. Complainant is the Executive Director of the 
Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer Affairs 
(wBoardH), and makes and files this accusation solely in his 
official capacity. 
License Status 
2. On or about November 13, 1990, Physician's and 
Surgeon's Certificate No. A 48888 was issued by the Board to 
LVK 
1 ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. (Mrespondentw), and at all times relevant 
2 herein, said Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate was in full 
3 force and effect. Said certificate expired May 31, 1994. 
4 Respondent is not a supervisor of a physician assistant. 
5 JPRISDICTION 
6 3. This accusation is brought before the Division of 
7 Medical Quality of the Medical Board of California, Department oi 
8 Consumer Affairs (hereinafter the "Division"), under the 
9 authority of the following sections of the California Business 
10 and Professions Code (hereinafter "Code"): 
11 A. Section 2227 of the Code provides that the 
12 Board may revoke, suspend for a period not to exceed one 
13 year, or place on probation and order the payment of 
14 probation monitoring costs, the license of any licensee who 
15 has been found guilty under the Medical Practice Act. 
16 B. Section 2234 of the Code provides that 
17 unprofessional conduct includes, but is not limited to, the 
18 following: 
19 n (a) Violating or attempting to violate, directly 
20 or indirectly, or assisting in or abetting the 
21 violation of, or conspiring to violate, any provision 
22 of this chapter. 
23 w(b) Gross negligence, 
24 w(c) Repeated negligent acts. 
25 w(d) Incompetence* 
26 w(e) The commission of any act involving 
27 dishonesty or corruption which is substantially related 
2. 
4(4-
1 to the qualifications, functions, or duties of a 
2 physician and surgeon • 
3 w (f) Any action or conduct which would have 
4 warranted the denial of a certificate. " 
5 C. Section 726 of the Code provides that the 
6 commission of any act of sexual abuse, misconduct, or 
7 relations with a patient, client, or customer constitutes 
8 luiprofessional conduct and grounds for disciplinary action 
9 for any person licensed under this division, under any 
10 initiative act referred to in this division and under 
11 Chapter 17 (commencing with section 9000) of Division 3, 
12 This section shall not apply to sexual contact between a 
13 physician and surgeon and his or her spouse or person in a: 
14 equivalent domestic relationship when that physician and 
15 surgeon provides medical treatment, other than 
16 psychotherapeutic treatment, to his or her spouse or perso 
17 in an equivalent domestic relationship, 
18 D. Section 729 of the Code provides, as relevs 
19 hereto, that 
20 "(a) Any physician and surgeon, psychotherapist, 
21 alcohol and drug abuse counselor or any person holding 
.22 himself or herself out to be a physician and surgeon, 
23 psychotherapist, or alcohol and drug abuse counselor, 
24 who engages in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, 
25 oral copulation, or sexual contact with a patient or 
26 client, or with a former patient or client when the 
27 relationship was terminated primarily for the purpose 
3. 
4-1G) 
1 of engaging in those acts, unless the physician and 
2 surgeon, psychotherapist, or alcohol and drug abuse 
3 counselor has referred the patient or client to an 
4 independent and objective physician and surgeon, 
5 psychotherapist, or alcohol and drug abuse counselor 
6 recommended by a third-party physician and surgeon, 
7 I psychotherapist, or drug and alcohol abuse counselor 
8 I for treatment, is guilty of sexual exploitation by a 
9 fi physician and surgeon, psychotherapist, or drug and 
10 alcohol abuse counselor." 
11 For purposes of subdivision (a), in no instance 
12 shall consent of the patient or client be a defense, 
13 However, physicians and surgeons shall not be guilty of 
14 sexual exploitation for touching any intimate part of a 
15 patient or client unless the touching is outside the scope 
16 of medical examination and treatment, or the touching is 
17 done for sexual gratification, 
18 "(c) For purposes of this section: 
19 "(1) Psychotherapist' has the same meaning as 
20 defined in Section 728, 
21 "(2) *Alcohol and drug abuse counselor' means an 
22 individual who holds himself or herself out to be an 
23 alcohol or drug abuse professional or paraprofessional. 
24 "(3) %Sexual contact' means sexual intercourse or 
25 the touching of an intimate part of a patient for the 
26 purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse. 
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"(4) 'Intimate part' and 'touching' have the same 
meanings as defined in Section 243.4 of the Penal 
Code." 
C. Section 125.3 of the Code provides, in part, 
that the Board may request the administrative law judge to 
direct any licentiate found to have committed a violation oi 
violations of the licensing act, to pay the Board a sum not 
to exceed the reasonable costs of the investigation and 
enforcement of the case. 
FACTS 
4. Respondent ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. is subject to 
disciplinary action on account of the following: 
Patient Nancy M. 
A. On or about January 29, 1990, Nancy M., a 32-
year-old female, became a patient at the University of 
California San Diego (UCSD), Department of Psychiatry, UCSD 
Outpatient Psychiatric Services. On initial intake she 
related symptoms of angry moods, depression, anxiety, 
insomnia, and confusion, with decreases in appetite, 
concentration, and short-term memory. She had given—birth 
to a daughter about four months previously and was 
experiencing marital difficulties with her husband, a 
physician. She was not suicidal but was fearful of becomiE 
as depressed as she had been when she had made a suicide 
attempt in 1979. 
\ \ \ 
\ \ \ 
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1 B. On or about March 5, 1990, the evaluator at 
2 UCSD prescribed a treatment plan which, in part, set forth 
3 DSM III diagnoses as follows: 
4 nAxis I- Adjustment disorder with depressive mood; 
5 rule out major depression recurrent; rule out post-
6 partum depression. 
7 "Axis II- Rule out borderline/narcissistic traits. 
8 11 n ti 
II . . . « 
9 Patient Nancy M. was assigned to receive individual 
10 I psychotherapy once per week. 
11 C. On or about July 27, 1990, the patient saw 
12 respondent for a medical/psychopharmacological evaluation. 
13 Respondent, who was employed as a psychiatric resident by 
14 UCSD Outpatient Psychiatric Services, Gifford Mental Health 
15 Center, prescribed imipramine, a drug for the relief of 
16 symptoms of depression, for this patient. Soon thereafter, 
17 responsibility for the care of Nancy M. was transferred to 
18 respondent. 
19 D. From on or about July 27, 1990, and 
20 continuing through and including June 22, 1992, respondent 
21 personally provided psychiatric care and treatment to this 
22 patient, and had a psychotherapist-patient relationship wit 
23 her. During the course of psychotherapy, respondent also 
24 prescribed Buspar, a drug for the management of anxiety 
25 disorders; Desipramine, an antidepressant drug; and Xanax, 
26 an anxiolytic. 
27 I \ \ \ 
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1 E. In or about May of 1991, respondent noted in 
2 his treatment record of Nancy M. that "She brought up that 
3 she heard me tell her she looked just like my ex-wife (do I 
4 disappoint her?) (does she wonder where my loyalties lie--
5 toward her treatment or another kind of relationship?) .,f 
6 F. On or about September of 1991, the 
7 administrator of respondent's residency program directed 
8 respondent to obtain supervision with Stephen G., a 
9 psychiatrist, due to respondent's self-reported confusion 
10 about patients having sexual feelings for him and about how 
11 he should handle such feelings in a therapeutic manner. 
12 G. During the course of therapy with respondent 
13 the patient dealt with her relationship with her husband; 
14 she exerted efforts to maintain such relationship. In his 
15 treatment notes, however, respondent states "It becomes 
16 clear how poorly matched the two are." 
17 H. On or about April 21, 1992, the patient and 
18 her husband broke up. 
19 I. On or about June 22, 1992, respondent noted 
20 in a medical record document entitled "Termination Summary' 
21 that Nancy M. (therein referred to as "Nancy H.") was 
22 functioning well, her divorce was "complete, in essence, a: 
23 she was doing well with the care of her child." Thereafte 
24 respondent wrote "Patient elects to terminate, as I am 
25 leaving practice here, she will self-refer to a new 
26 therapist [as needed]." 
27 I \ \ \ 
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1 II J. On or about June 22, 1992, an intimate sexual 
2 II relationship began between respondent and Nancy ft. On June 
3 II 23, 1992, and theretofore, respondent professed his love for 
4 Nancy M,, as well as love for "her wisdom, her laughter, her 
5 strength, her body, her spirit, her child, and her soul." 
6 The relationship between them terminated approximately two 
7 years later, but not before she had become pregnant and had 
8 an abortion. 
9 5. As a result of the conduct described in paragraph 4 
10 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of sexual 
11 misconduct and sexual exploitation, in violation of Code sections 
12 726 and 729, as more particularly alleged hereinafter: 
13 A. During the course of psychotherapy with Nancy 
14 M., respondent committed severe boundary violations, in that 
15 (1) Respondent undermined the patient's 
16 relationship with her treating psychotherapist and arranged 
17 for the patient to be transferred to respondent's caseload 
18 in order to have increased contact with her for 
19 nontherapeutic reasons; 
20 (2) In the course of psychotherapy 
21 respondent undermined the marriage of Nancy M. and her 
22 husband by methodically preying on her vulnerabilities, 
23 weaknesses, and dependency during a time of marital distres 
24 and confusion; 
25 (3) Respondent met with Nancy M. in non-
26 therapeutic settings including the park, restaurants, and 
27 I \ \ \ 
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his apartment, the last of which he called his "borrowed 
office;" 
(4) Respondent disclosed personal 
information about himself which was irrelevant to the 
treatment of Nancy M.; 
(5) Respondent related to Nancy M. in an 
increasingly seductive and erotic fashion, in that he hugged 
her, offered to massage her sore muscles, kissed her, 
fondled her breasts, and professed his love for her; this 
seduction began while Nancy M. was under the care of 
respondent during his residency at UCSD, and culminated in £ 
sexual relationship (sexual intercourse) soon after the 
completion of respondent's residency; 
(6) As a result of the betrayal by 
respondent of the psychotherapeutic relationship, Nancy M. 
suffered severe psychological damage, including symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, guilt, anger, mistrust of authority 
figures, and difficulties with intimacy. 
B. Respondent methodically manipulated this 
patient and her treatment in order to use her as an object 
to gratify his own emotional and sexual needs. 
6. As a result of the conduct described in paragraph 
4 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of gross 
negligence, in violation of Code section 2234(b), as more 
particularly alleged hereinafter: 
A. Complainant realleges paragraphs 5A and 5B 
their entirety at this point. 
9. 
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1 II 7. As a result of the conduct described in paragraph 
2 I  4 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of 
3 I  incompetence, in violation of Code section 2234(d), as more 
4 particularly alleged hereinafter: 
5 A, Complainant realleges paragraphs 5A and 5B in 
6 their entirety at this point. 
7 8. As a result of the conduct described in paragraph 
8 4 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of 
9 corruption, which are substantially related to the 
10 qualifications, functions, or duties of a physician and surgeon, 
11 in violation of Code section 2234(e), as more particularly 
12 alleged hereinafter: 
13 A. Complainant realleges paragraphs 5A and 5B in 
14 their entirety at this point. 
15 PRAYER 
16 WHEREFORE, complainant requests that the Division hold 
17 a hearing on the matters alleged herein, and that following said 
18 hearing, the Division issue a decision: 
19 1. Revoking or suspending Physician's and Surgeon's 
20 Certificate Number A 48888, heretofore issued to 
21 respondent ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. ; 
22 2. Directing respondent ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D., to pay 
23 to the Board a reasonable sum for its 
24 investigative and enforcement costs of this actio 
25 and, if placed on probation, to pay the probation 
26 monitoring costs; and 
27 I \ \ \ 
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3. Taking such other and further action as the Board 
deems appropriate to protect the public health, 
safety, and welfare. 
DATED: wnvftmhar 4f 1996 
Ron Joseph, Executive Director 
Medical Board of California 
Department of Consumer Affairs 
State of California 
Complainant 
< OTtfA 
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APPENDIX C - ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF 
ROBERT A. WEITZEL 
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO PRESCRIBE 
AND ADMINISTER CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER ON MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. DOPL-99-71 
APPEARANCES: 
Peter Stirba for Respondent 
Elizabeth A. Bowman for the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAKT JUDGE: 
Respondent filed an August 20, 1999 motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, with a supporting memorandum, thus seeking the 
dismissal of this case. The Division filed a September 27, 
1999 responsive memorandum. Respondent filed an October 7, 1999 
final reply. 
Oral argument on the motion was conducted November 8, 1999 
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the 
Department of Commerce. The Court took the motion under 
advisement at the conclusion of oral argument. 
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, now enters 
its Conclusions of Law and Order: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Respondent initially contends this adjudicative proceeding 
should be dismissed because R156-1-502 (1), the rule whereby the 
Division seeks entry of a disciplinary sanction as to 
Respondent's licenses in this case, exceeds the scope of the 
Division's rulemaking authority as delegated by the Utah 
Legislature. Respondent further urges the rule is invalid as 
inconsistent with U.C.A. §58-1-501(2), which generally defines 
unprofessional conduct. 
Respondent also asserts R156-1-502 (1) impermissibly expands 
the definition of unprofessional conduct and thus subjects a 
licensee to potential disciplinary action for engaging in conduct 
that, by itself, is not improper. Respondent further contends: 
(1) R156-1-502 (1) violates substantive and procedural due 
process; (2) the rule is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the 
rule constitutes an improper exercise of legislative power by an 
executive branch agency and is thus violative of the 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers applicable to-the 
tripartite branches of government. 
The Division argues R156-1-502(1) represents a valid 
exercise of its rulemaking authority. The Division urges the 
Legislature has expressly delegated broad authority to the 
Division to define unprofessional conduct by rule and R156-1-
502(1) promotes the same purpose served by the statutory 
2 
definitions of unprofessional conduct set forth in §58-1-502(2). 
The Division also asserts R156-1-502 (1) is rationally 
designed to protect the public from a licensee who elects to 
surrender their license in another jurisdiction with either an 
investigation pending or a proceeding in progress which involves 
unprofessional or unlawful conduct and who then relocates to Utah 
with the hope of avoiding any entry of a disciplinary sanction. 
The Division vigorously urges R156-1-502(1) should be sustained 
as representing a proper discharge of its mandate to protect the 
public under such circumstances. 
§63-46b-l(4)(b) provides a presiding officer may grant a 
timely motion to dismiss an adjudicative proceeding "if the 
requirements of Rule 12 (b) . . • of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are met by the moving party". R151-46b-7(6)(a) further 
provides: 
Subsection 63-46b-l(4)(b) shall not be 
construed to prohibit a presiding officer 
from granting a timely motion to dismiss for 
. . . failure to establish a claim upon which 
relief may be granted . . . . 
The Court assumes - for purposes of this motion - the accuracy of 
the facts alleged in the April 29, 1999 Petition, whereby this 
adjudicative proceeding was initiated. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 
552, 561 (Utah App. 1994). The Court thus acknowledges 
Respondent surrendered his license to practice medicine in 
California after that state had initiated proceedings, wherein it 
3 
was alleged Respondent was incompetent and he had engaged in 
grossly negligent conduct, unprofessional conduct and sexual 
misconduct. 
Prior to addressing the threshold issue presented by 
Respondent's motion, the Court initially notes this forum lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction to address Respondent's varied 
constitutional challenges to R156-1-502(1). It is well 
established that administrative agencies lack the power to 
determine the constitutionally of statutes, Clayton v. Bennett, 
5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531, 533 (1956); Johnson v. Utah State 
Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980); Davis v. 
Robinson, 871 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1994), This Court readily 
concludes the same jurisdictional limit applies when an agency 
rule is subject to constitutional attack. 
There is another preliminary matter to be considered. The 
Division urges public policy demands a licensee should be subject 
to potential disciplinary action in this state if the licensee 
chooses to surrender their license without proving their 
innocence in a foreign jurisdiction. Essentially, the Division 
argues its regulatory authority should prevent a licensee from 
fleeing to Utah as a safe haven without having fully litigated 
allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct in the sister 
state. 
The Court readily acknowledges R156-1-502(1) appears to 
4 
reflect sound policy. That rule certainly allows the Division to 
most effectively protect the public. However, it is not within 
the province of this Court to weight policy arguments which might 
sustain R156-1-502 (1), analyze the purpose for that rule, assess 
the wisdom of such a provision or generally determine whether the 
rule embodies good policy. Tennessee Cable Television Ass'n v. 
Tennessee Public Service Commission, 844 S.W.2d 151, 168 (Tenn. 
App. 1992). 
Rather, the fundamental inquiry before the Court is whether 
R156-1-502 (1) represents a proper exercise of the Division's 
rulemaking authority as delegated by the Legislature. §58-1-203 
provides: 
The following duties, functions, and 
responsibilities of the division shall be 
performed by the division with the 
collaboration and assistance of the 
appropriate board: 
(5) defining unprofessional 
conduct, by rule, to supplement the 
definitions under this chapter or 
other licensing chapters. 
§58-1-501(2) generally provides unprofessional conduct means 
conduct by a licensee as defined "under this title or under any 
rule adopted under this title". 
§58-1-501(2) then sets forth eleven definitions of 
unprofessional conduct. Subsection (d) of that statute provides 
such conduct includes: 
. . . engaging in conduct that results in 
5 
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disciplinary action, including reprimand, 
censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or 
revocation, by any other licensing or 
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over 
the licensee . . . if the conduct would, in 
this state, constitute grounds for denial of 
licensure or disciplinary proceedings under 
Section 58-1-401. 
Pursuant to §58-1-203(5), the Division has promulgated R156-1-
502(1) to define unprofessional conduct as: 
(1) surrendering licensure to any other 
licensing or regulatory authority having 
jurisdiction over the licensee . . . while an 
investigation or inquiry into allegations of 
unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in 
progress or after a charging document has 
been filed against the . . . licensee 
alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct. 
Utah courts have addressed the general nature and scope of 
legislative grants of authority to state agencies. The Utah 
Supreme Court captured that issue in somewhat colorful terms in 
IML Freight, Inc. et al. v C.N. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1975), stating: 
It is axiomatic that a statutory 
administrative agent of the state enjoys or 
suffers the favor or forbearance of 
legislative fiat, as the circumstances may 
enjoin. His beneficence or capability to 
obligate, restrict or expand, extends no 
farther than the metes and bounds of the 
bailiwick in which the lawmakers grant or 
limit his sovereignty. Beyond that, he must 
risk the happenstance of possible 
constitutional, legislative or judicial 
circumscription. Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has generally identified the limit of a 
6 
state agencyfs exercise of a legislative grant of authority. The 
Court has thus recognized: 
The Industrial Commission is not free to 
"legislate" in areas apparently overlooked by 
our lawmakers or to exercise power not 
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the 
legislature, even in the name of fairness. 
Bevans v. Industrial Commission, 790 P.2d 573, 578 (Utah App. 
1990). 
The issue squarely framed by Respondent's motion is whether 
the Division - in promulgating R156-1-502 (1) - exceeded the scope 
of its rulemaking authority as conferred by the Legislature. 
Such authority has been generally described in these terms: 
• . . the power to adopt rules is a 
legislative power, delegated within 
constitutional restrictions. Rules adopted 
pursuant to such lawfully delegated authority 
are valid only if they are adopted in 
accordance with prescribed procedures, 
conform to controlling provisions of organic 
and statutory law other than those relating 
to the scope and extent of delegated power, 
are supported by an adequate factual basis, 
are an appropriate exercise of agency 
discretion, and are within the scope and 
extent of the power delegated by the 
legislature. Concern here is only with the 
last of these requirements. 
24 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 309, 332-33. The two standards frequently 
used by courts to assess whether rulemaking authority has been 
properly exercised are as follows: 
The first is that a rule cannot "enlarge, 
modify, or contravene the provisions of the 
statute." The second is that the rule must 
be "reasonably related to the purposes of the 
i n. 
enabling legislation." In generally 
comparing these two standards, one can 
immediately see that while the first relates 
to the provisions of the statute, the second 
relates to the purposes of the statute. This 
alone is a significant distinction. Id. 
Whether a state agency has promulgated a rule within the 
appropriate bounds of legislatively delegated authority 
necessarily requires due consideration of the statutes relevant 
to the exercise of that authority. Thus, it has been stated: 
Many statutes include a section containing 
a statement of purpose or intent. However, a 
statute almost never consists solely of such 
a statement. Rather, a statute customarily 
includes many other provisions that establish 
the particular programs and means to be 
employed to achieve the expressed or implied 
purposes of the statute. Since there are 
numerous ways to achieve a given purpose, the 
provisions of the statute are invariably more 
specific than its purpose. 
Because the standard that a rule cannot 
"enlarge, modify, or contravene the 
provisions of the statute" requires a more 
specific relation to the statute, one might 
expect that it would be a stricter standard. 
In applying this standard, fewer rules should 
be found valid. Conversely, the standard 
that a rule must be "reasonably related to 
the purposes of the enabling legislation" 
does not require such a specific relation to 
the statute, One might expect that it would 
be an easier standard to meet, so that in 
applying that standard, more rules would be 
found valid. Id. at 333-34. 
Significantly, it has also been .recognized that: 
The fact that application of one standard 
or the other is apparently so predictive of 
the outcome might give rise to the suspicion 
that they are not really employed as 
standards at all, but rather as 
8 
justifications. Consciously or 
unconsciously, the choice of the standard may 
not precede evaluation of the rule, but in 
fact may be determined after the decision on 
whether to uphold the rule is made on other, 
less well-defined grounds. 
It is also possible that circumstances 
other than the decision of whether to uphold 
the rule dictate the choice of the standard. 
Even though both standards, by their own 
terms, attempt to measure a rule against the 
scope and extent of the power delegated by 
the enabling act, administrative law judges 
and the courts may find it impractical or 
impossible to apply a particular standard in 
some situations. One immediate thought is 
that the "enlarge the provisions" standard 
cannot be applied in some instances precisely 
because there are no specific provisions that 
can be reasonably identified as the law being 
implemented by the rule. 
Regardless of the reasons dictating the 
choice of the standard, if the standard is 
determined before a rule is considered 
against its requirements, two points are 
clear. First, the initial choice of the 
standard is vitally important. Second, the 
"enlarge the provisions" standard is 
considerably more strict than the "related to 
the purpose" standard. Id. at 336-37. 
The foregoing analysis readily explains the clear dichotomy 
between the submissions filed by the parties on the motion now 
under review. The lynchpin of Respondent's argument is that 
R156-1-502 (1) exceeds the proper scope of the Division's 
rulemaking authority to define unprofessional conduct. 
Conversely, the essence of the Division's position is that R151-
1-502(1) promotes its primary charge to protect the public in a 
manner entirely similar to the various definitions of 
unprofessional conduct set forth in §58-1-502(2). 
9 
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Utah courts have alternatively employed the "related to the 
purpose" and the "enlarge the provisions" standards in various 
cases to address whether an agency has properly exercised its 
rulemaking authority. When the rule in question has been 
sustained as being an appropriate exercise of such authority, the 
focus has often been whether the rule was "reasonably necessary", 
"consistent with" the duties to be performed by the agency and 
whether the rule served "significant purposes". Consolidation 
Coal Company v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 886 
P.2d 514, 527 (Utah 1994); Howell v. County Board of Cache County 
ex rel IHC Hospitals, Inc., 881 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1994) C\ . . 
we conclude that the Tax Commission acted in accordance with its 
charge to administer and supervise the state tax laws"); South 
Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 
951 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1997) CxIn addition to the presumption of 
validity that accompanies agency rules, rule 78 is supported by 
sound policy . . . . Rule 78 is an effective method of 
accomplishing the purpose of the statute"). 
Alternatively, when a rule has been invalidated as exceeding 
an agency's rulemaking authority, courts have acknowledged the 
"long-standing principle of administrative law that an agency's 
rules must be consistent with its governing statutes7' and "a rule 
that is out of harmony with a governing statute is invalid". 
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. State Tax Commission, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 
10 
(Utah 1993); Eaton Kenway, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 906 P.2d 
882, 885 (Utah 1995); Crossroads Plaza Association v. Pratt, 912 
P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1996); Mt. Olympus Waters, Inc. v. Tax 
Commission, 877 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah App. 1994); Fussell v. 
Department of Commerce, 815 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1991) (the 
rule "is out of harmony with its controlling statute"). 
Utah courts have stated an administrative agency's authority 
to promulgate regulations: 
. . . is limited to those regulations which 
are consonant with the statutory framework, 
and neither contrary to the statute nor 
beyond its scope . . . . Administrative 
regulations inay not conflict with the design 
of an Act, and when they do the court has a 
duty to invalidate them . . .Furthermore, 
when an administrative official misconstrues 
a statute and issues a regulation beyond the 
scope of the statute, it is in excess of 
administrative authority granted . . . . 
Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 762 P.2d 1119, 
1122 (Utah App. 1988); Dustyfs, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 842 
P.2d 868, 871 (Utah 1992); Miller v. Division of Consumer 
Protection, 962 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 1998) ("administrative 
regulations may not extend beyond the scope of a statute"); 
Belnorth Petroleum v. State Tax Commission, 845 P.2d 266, 271 
(Utah App. 1993). 
Thus, our courts have declared rules "are subordinate to 
statutes and cannot confer greater rights or disabilities". 
Rocky Mountain Energy v. State Tax Commission, 852 P.2d 284, 287 
11 
(Utah 1993); IML Freight, Inc. et al. v. C.N. Ottosen, supra at 
297 (". . . the legislature may not delegate authority to a Board 
to adopt rules or regulations which abridge, enlarge, extend, or 
modify the statute creating the right or imposing the duty"); 
Ferro v. Department of Commerce, 828 P.2d, 507, 512 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 
supra. 
Statutes, and administrative rules should generally be 
construed according to their plain language. Archer v. Board of 
State Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995). Thus, 
each term of a statute or an administrative rule should be read 
literally "unless such a reading is unreasonably inoperable or 
confused". See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 814 
P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991). 
The Fussell Court invalidated a rule which engrafted a 
requirement beyond that set forth in its statutory counterpart. 
Significantly, the Court concluded the rule "goes beyond the 
intent of the legislature as reflected in the language of [the 
statute]". Id. at 254. The Court noted the Division's argument 
that the rule "is necessary, as a matter of policy, to protect 
the public from inadequately prepared practitioners". Id. 
The Fussell Court further recognized the Legislature had 
adopted the policy - represented by the challenged rule - through 
a subsequent enactment. Significantly, the Court thus stated 
12 
that "whatever policy drawbacks may have existed under the former 
statute, it was up to the legislature to provide a remedy." id. 
The Fussell Court concluded the Division - by promulgating the 
rule in question - ^ improperly encroached upon the legislature's 
sole province" and such a "usurpation of legislative function" 
invalidated the rule. Id. at 254-55. 
§58-1-501(2) (d) is the statutory half-cousin of R156-1-
502(1). Both the statute and the rule share a common purpose. 
Nevertheless, the critical difference between §58-1-501(2) (d) and 
R156-l-502(l) is that the statute applies when disciplinary 
action is entered by another licensing or regulatory authority, 
whereas the rule is premised on the relinquishment of a license 
in the face of allegations which might have otherwise prompted 
entry of disciplinary action after contested litigation or 
through a stipulation. R156-1-502(1) essentially equates the 
surrender of a license - when coupled with outstanding 
allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct - with the 
entry of disciplinary action on the license. 
The Division generally contends the Court should apply 
various principles of statutory construction to sustain the 
validity of R156-l-502(l). The Division urges that rule should 
be construed "to harmonize its provisions" in accordance with the 
"intent and purpose" of §58-1-501(2). See V-l Oil Company v. 
Department of Environmental Quality, 904 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App. 
13 
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1994). The Division also argues this Court should recognize both 
the broad discretion granted to the Division by the Legislature 
to define unprofessional conduct by rule and that the Division 
has exercised its expertise in promulgating R156-1-502 (1). The 
Division thus asserts the Court should accord due deference to 
the terras of the rule. 
The Court finds and concludes both §58-1-501(2) and R156-1-
502(1) are unambiguous. Thus, it is not necessary to resort to 
principles of statutory construction to ascertain the meaning of 
those provisions. The Court duly notes the Division's urgence 
that R156-l-502(l) should be interpreted as consistent with its 
mandate to protect the public. The Court also acknowledges the 
Division's assertion that the Legislature - when enacting §58-1-
502(2) (d) - may not have been aware of the strategy which could 
be utilized by a licensee of a sister state to surrender their 
license in that jurisdiction in the face of pending disciplinary 
sanction and then flee to Utah to continue an uninterrupted 
practice of their profession. 
R156-l-502(l) is entitled to a presumption of validity. 
South Central Utah Telephone Association, Inc. v. State Tax 
Commission, supra. However, whether that rule exceeds the scope 
of the Division's rulemaking authority is a question of law. The 
proper analysis under §63-46b-16(4) (d) as to whether a state 
agency "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law" was 
14 
described in Bevans v. Industrial Commission, supra: 
Before the adoption of UAPA (Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act), issues 
involving the interpretation of the statutory 
boundaries of an agency's power and authority 
were treated by Utah courts as questions of 
law, which are reviewed under a correction-
of-error standard with no deference to the 
agency's determinations. This absence of 
deference is appropriate because a 
determination of what authority has been 
statutorily conferred on an administrative 
agency by the Legislature is not "illuminated 
by [the] agency's expertise"'. (Citations 
omitted). Id. at 575-76. 
The Bevans Court concluded the same standard continues to apply 
when reviewing such an issue under the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. Id. at 576. 
The Court finds and concludes it is a misnomer to 
characterize the Division's promulgation of R156-1-502(1) as 
based on an exercise of agency expertise to thus warrant 
deferential treatment of that rule. Rather, the Division has 
simply concluded §58-1-501(2) is not broad enough to address the 
consequences which should attend the surrender of a license xn 
another jurisdiction amid allegations of unprofessional or 
unlawful conduct in that forum. 
The Division's interpretation of the scope of its rulemaking 
authority - and this Court's determination of that issue - should 
only be upheld if "it is not erroneous". Bevans v. Industrial 
Commission, supra. The appellate courts of this state are the 
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arbiters most qualified to ultimately resolve the issue now under 
review. Bevans v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
The Court acknowledges the "subject of professional 
performance is too comprehensive to be codified in detail". 
Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124, 129 (Utah 1983). By its terms, 
§58-1-502 is not meant to be all-inclusive. Accordingly, it is 
clear that unprofessional conduct can be defined by both statute 
and rule. 
The Court thus reiterates §58-1-203(5) authorizes the 
Division to promulgate rules to "supplement" statutory 
definitions of unprofessional conduct. That term has a common 
meaning as "something that completes or makes an addition." 
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985). 
However, the Court finds and concludes R156-1-502 (1) does 
far more than merely supplement §58-1-502 (d). The rule 
substantially expands and operatively amends the scope of its 
statutory relative. Moreover, the Court also finds and concludes 
R156-l-502(l) is fundamentally distinct from the framework o£ 
unprofessional conduct generally established by §58-1-502(2). 
§§58-1-502(2)(a)-(k) allows the entry of a disciplinary 
sanction based on some underlying misconduct or adverse condition 
of the licensee. However, the surrender of a license in the face 
of allegations of unprofessional conduct does not necessarily 
establish those allegations. An individual who holds licenses in 
16 
multiple jurisdictions could understandably elect to forego 
contesting allegations of unprofessional conduct in any given 
state for various reasons, not all of which are directly 
probative of whether the licensee actually engaged in conduct 
violative of any statutes or rules which thus govern their 
profession. 
The Division contends courts in other states have recognized 
the authority of a licensing agency to protect the public by 
disciplining a licensee who surrenders their license when there 
has been no admission of unprofessional conduct in the foreign 
jurisdiction. The Division thus relies on Butts v. Wyoming State 
Board of Architects, 911 P.2d 1062 (Wyo 1996); In re Tatreauf 
1996 WL 601653 (an unpublished 1996 opinion of the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals); Marek v. Board of Podiatric Medicine, 16 Cal. 
App.4th 1089 (1993); Clare v. State Board of Accountancy, 10 
Cal.App.4th 294 (1992); and Sternberg v. Administrative Review 
Board for Professional Medical Conduct, 652 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1997). 
Butts involved an architect subject to disciplinary action 
in Wyoming after his Kentucky license had been suspended pursuant 
to a settlement agreement. The physician in Tatreau faced 
disciplinary action in Minnesota after he surrendered his 
Colorado license with a provision that any subsequent renewal or 
reinstatement of that license would be restricted and limited. 
Most significantly, Minnesota law expressly provided that the 
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"restriction" or "limitation" of a license constituted grounds 
for disciplinary action. Id, at 2, 
Marek involved two physicians who were subject to 
disciplinary action in California after their Nevada licenses had 
been revoked and then placed on probation pursuant to a consent 
decree. The accountant in Clare faced disciplinary action in 
California after his ability to practice before another 
governmental agency (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) had been 
suspended. Sternberg involved a physician subject to 
disciplinary action in New York after he surrendered his Florida 
license who acknowledged - to avoid a license suspension, a term 
of probation and a substantial fine which had been entered on a 
complaint subject to appeal - that the Florida surrender "was 
deemed to be in the nature of a disciplinary action against his 
license". Id. (All emphasis herein added.) 
The Division also relies on Cooper v. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 1996 WL 571398 (an unpublished 1996 opinion 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania). Pursuant to a consent decree, the physician in 
Cooper surrendered his Pennsylvania license in exchange for a 
dismissal of all pending disciplinary charges. Significantly, 
the physician then faced exclusion from participation in various 
federal health care programs based on a statute which expressly 
authorized such disciplinary action under those circumstances. 
18 
The foregoing cases are all distinguishable - either 
factually or with particular regard for the controlling law in 
those cases - from this proceeding- The Buttsr Marek, Clare and 
Sternberg cases each involved the entry of disciplinary action in 
the sister state prior to subsequent licensure proceedings in 
another state. There was a governing state statute in Tratreau 
which expressly authorized a subsequent licensure proceeding in 
the second state based on the nature of the action initially 
entered in the first state. The governing federal statute in 
Cooper likewise expressly authorized a subsequent proceeding 
after the initial surrender of the license elsewhere. None of 
the foregoing cases present the same critical facts and governing 
law which is germane to this proceeding. 
The Court reiterates sound public policy arguments may exist 
to warrant a subsequent amendment to §58-1-502 (2) (d) . However, 
the ultimate "prerogative and responsibility to address such 
arguments and "set policy" to most effectively promote the 
preeminent purpose behind regulation of professions charged with 
the public interest resides in the Legislature. Crowther v. 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, supra. 
Notwithstanding the Division's salutary intent to discharge 
its mandate to protect the public, the Division exceeded the 
scope of its rulemaking authority when it promulgated R156-1-
502(1). Furthermore, R156-1-502 (1) is not consistent with the 
19 
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statutory framework of §58-1-502(2). Based on the foregoing, the 
Court thus concludes R156-1-502(1) is invalid. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's August 20, 1999 motion 
to dismiss this adjudicative proceeding is granted with 
prejudice. Specifically, R156-1-502(1) exceeds the scope of the 
Division's rulemaking authority as delegated by the Legislature. 
The rule is also inconsistent with the statutory framework 
reflected in §58-1-502(2). R156-1-502 (1) thus provides no proper 
basis to enter a disciplinary sanction in this case as to 
Respondent's licenses to practice medicine and to prescribe and 
administer controlled substances in this state. 
Agency review of this Order may be obtained by filing a 
request for agency review with the Executive Director, Department 
of Commerce, within thirty (30) days after the date of this — 
Order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in 
§63-46b-12 of the Utah Code and §R151-4 6b-12 of the Utah 
Administrative Code. 
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APPENDIX D - ORDER ON REVIEW, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OFI-4W 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCi 
< >i THE STATE OF UTAH 
!.»! I Hit MA J J'liKUl' riJhRJ-OliI'M 
, I'AGl-NCYRFVIIW;:!' 
ROBERI A.WEITZEL,M.D. 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
DOPL Case No. w /'[ 
ORDER 
Hie Findings of J'act, Conclusions ol 1 ,<i*v ciikl Ucxommended Order in. this matter are 
ratified and adopted by the Executive Director of the Department of *' "oniiiicn'i11 '.wil i , 
therefore 
O.RDERED that the Order on Motion to Dismiss heretofore entered dismissing this 
aUR*. -• yi t> -uce should In „ ,mJ v\ liru'by, hrversed and this matter is remanded to the 
Division of Occupational and Prolessioiial Licensing ioi lu!ilhH prourdings on the merits. 
SO ORDERED this the /jG ^ d a y of .May, 2000. 
DOUGLAS CfBORBA, ExeoftiveyDirector 
Utah Depanment of Commerce 
BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERU 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONS ) 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
PETITIONER 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW a 1 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
DOPLcaseNo. 9y-7f 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter came on \ ^  :*. ^..
 t ' v -\ * * \ tew filed by 01 or behalf ^f 
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licen:-.
 f _ ^ ?o appc i 
the (iisnir l .ii i'i itli [Hi" • *s adjudicative action against Robert A vveii/; i r.ereaii 
MWeitzer)wiihu(iit«I ... . _ t^ 
STATl (i k\ (Mt PTTT.FS PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted ptjisuaiii w" Sivlmn 6^-46b-12, 
i. iH i i" ...i.uaifM IKI IMeR151-46b-12ofthe Utah Administrative Co H 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
1, Whether the definition oi "i up ii'rsurmal nmdiia" rmitained in the Division's 
>" UTAH ADMIN, RISC)-1-502(1) exceeds the scop*" >i <•> i- H I - I R I J I J ; . ' I U K M H U J.I i • nconsistent 
wiili Hit ;Jahji«i ) ti.it*'. i« .i i UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-501(2); and 
1 
2 Whether the Division's Petition states a cause ol ailici •<.'''• ||'1* definition 
of "unprofessional romli lamcil in UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-501(2) regardless of the 
validity of UTAH ADMIN. R156-1-5021 (I 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. (hi or ^bout April 29, 1 099, the Division Itli il.;» Petition against WeitzH lor 
unprofessional com hi. •  4» • r * nc fiPnp vas that Weitzel had surrendered his license to 
practice medicine in the State of California upoi sli| julaird agreement entered into on February 
14, 1007 rXiipiiIation"1 -^cepted and adopted by the Medical Board i»l i uliioniM i"HiMhl"l .'r; 
its decision i>. i 7. 
2 : .stipulation incotporated rained in an 
Accusal/i 'ii filfi' 'iRainst Weitzel by 'the Board on or aooui Novemix.. 
alleged that Weitzel was siilifcr i u i disciplinary action as a result of having committed sexual. 
misconduct and sexually exploited a patient and MMIJ'IH lu luv WrifzcPs license revoked or 
fpuspcnded. 
3. "J fie lem^ *i( Hi itipulauon \wx\vx which Weitzel was allowed to settle the 
(California case provided that Weitzel gave up his nj'Jn in. ilrnv ilr,n t .wise for discipline existed, 
,uul he ivnecd to surrender his license with the midei"j*in«lifig that he would ni> 1«Mi/„*™"™ i-« 
permitted to prtieii-n' mwinrnt; u I'^lif-iniiii, The stipulation further provided that if Weilzeljsver 
sought relicensure in California lie would have In i nini'Iv villi nil the laws, regulations and 
i;«j«•«! • i f ! es for reinstatement of a revoked -license... and all oi the charges and allegations 
contained in |ih*i Ac truuaium . v ill be deemed to be true, correct and admitted by [Weitzel]." 
()n or about June 7, I ' W. V 'eil.'H i /uisnl n M:S|NHIM in be filed to the Division's 
Petitir nerally denying the allegations contained in the Division1"^  I'etiUoi ^fiUt f| ' ' M ' - e p t i o i i 
•'' "  (.- he sinit'n4\,v I Ins f ^(ifornia license. Weitzel further filed a number of Affirmative 
Defenses, including a challenge that the Division • mk I-1 wuyp, iiMi-i-.)fessional conduct was 
2 
* nf t*^ r^'whnm hi enact and enforce. 
5. i W9, Weitzel filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
leadings in which he argued, inter alia, that the Division •> nit defining, "improti-iisiunal 
is beyond the authority of the Division, The motion came before the Adnniuujali vi 
»-• 'uui!' 'ALJ""") iu>'lMMMFi[» i « Miiv-pphcr 8, 19^0, mul an order was entered on November 
1
 * 1999 dismissing the Division's adjudicative proceeding vviiii pivimhuv Specifically, the ALJ 
efinition of unprofessional conduct set forth in the Division's rule exceeded the 
*. n <M' .. nt\; i dlciiiaiiiij.' aiitnon; v .IIIJ is inconsistent with the statutory framework 
reflected by the statute defining unprofessional conduct 
< ON<1 HSIONSOFLAW 
1. I V Division and Weitzel agree in theii i" * N "i this appeal presents only a 
legal question and therefore lulls undci ihr '"rnun in ,.", viiifi'Lini of review, 1 li-.r issue of 
whether the Division's rule exceeded its rulemaking authority, and ihr. in (lindanes < >l" the statute it 
iv. is Jillciiii-iiiti" i-1 de fine, presents only a legal issue upon which the ALJ is entitle'* > 
ill ifrence [Slate vr J'enu, 8r % - . 94)] since this case was decided below in a 
summary disposition which did not resolve tactual d:>puu- [Si'hmf, fMfli ni N 4m Inc. 814 
P M li'lK (Hiiih l ^ l n 
2. In the i.aso ui h M, ihr I h vi •*•* ur r alleged thai WriTzel's California 
licensing matter fell within the definition of "unproie .>,-. >th by the 
gt«< ". 11 I < 'iisirip, statute .as well as by rule adopted by the Division. The Divisior r- reuuon was 
supported by the documenUlm> >n( tht f California proceeding, including the stipulation entered 
into by Weitzel to resolve the charges calling 1 ;Th surrender of 
3. Following a nt >ii i% i in Vv'cil^ jel's motion ( > dismiss the Division's action, the 
learned ALJ below entered an order dismissing the Division's pro i lie 
•:atterof la1*-t^ .-M T'^ iTlu'- ih* IUIC pi a 'h% statute couh.«, 
appeal, ^v.,^;>,. •itfav^-iM* •- u nonmoving party a^: t ii i 
J where it appears that there is no genuine dispuiv ^f far -:*»'* —•* 
i- entitled to judgment as a mattei o? -i *.* Swen.^*t i i- * * - *. /. 
K e p ) 2 ( l - u t i • j< ). 
4. The ALJV- consideration of WeitzcJ's molion IUKI n 41. 1 1 in ii all • .1 m (acts and 
'.<.-.'!.-( - • r nst favorable to the loser - the Division - be accepted as pi oven m 
considering : , iiMtun . II .', ih.it siandjid which must also be applied on appeal in 
Uiis forum. Don - >ouchet Ross & (lo.9 926 J".AI bJ'i «I »UI« I'W-
5. I'he ili.smrssnl of the Division's action below would necessarily have requueu the 
ALJ to find il in i !aliloimd acln'C «("iJp«iliiij; flu* admissions of Weitzel contained therein, did 
not brinj \n's allegations within the statutoi) iramcwiMl. ni ilit; ildhnt'^r nf 
f,unpi -. sshiirii 1 ,i i.Miiif ff 10 reach such a conclusion, Although to reach his conclusions 01 law 
required acceptance by the Ai .1 01 iltc Lit Is niosl frifinable to the Divisions position, such fact 
^m bv the ALJ is entitled no deference whatsocvei since an (ails, wi.a ..'idnmifabk1 tor the 
* •. i • • ||1 wafzelfs motion 
n < I" Ihvnnnis Pennon again1,! WViizel's Utah license relied upon incorporation of 
the action ol a sisler state against his medical hn*usc I lie alkgaliuiu 1 > in*' Si 'ifornia 
a^i \htitirt wriT contained in the charging document Jiicd by the Medical ;>o-cj.. 
California on July 28, 1(^ ,„"" 1 ill." , ii'uiiioh assrilrJ thai Weitzel had committed acts of sexual 
misconduct and sexual exploitation ol a patient, as well as ach • >l gu«»s negligence, arts of 
i and acts of corruption. 
7. The LaiiloiTJiii (litHTcvInti* again'J Weitzel was resolved through an agreement 
whereby Weitzel relinquished his license to practice medicine m Hid 
- Weitzel's agreement also gave up any right to challenge 1. **. 
him, and specified that , him would "be deemed to be true, correct 
•ami .'mil iiitit il iii iriv fnfnre consideration of his fitness to hold a meaiv<:. — : »
 Kcd 
ilial his licence would I* iir-ilcd .i'i wun : okedlicense if reinstaiement was evei 
by him. 
8. T h|s response to the allegations in the Division's Petition, Weilzel aiiiiultci! \\u 
surrendei ot Im Laliioniia h u ii>c while denying that the surrender was based upon any alleged 
misconduct, including unprofessional condua * \ ision's claim that 
MII rrndeMiii' ;i license in California would constitute unprofessional tonuu»; «; _is. 
" i "I lie stipulation enlci w! ,vv W :; • ' in California, although styled a surrender is, 
under the facts and reasonable inferences most i .>,..;- - -• uif <- nam ; 
only i ill practical purposes the stipulation served the office of a confession ot judgment, 
with the sui render to bt ucuied ai lca?;i in < 'iilifornia - as nothing less than a de facto revocalu 11 
of licensure. 
10. R egardless of whether the challenged rule in this case is ultra vires9 in conduct] J ^ , 
a review of the ordei ironi iri-iuv fjiaiiliiig Waiy«T\ iinnimn and dismissing the Division's 
proceeding with prejudice, it is'necessary t<..« i .'pi tin: Calilonua J»IIM reelings and allegations 
t • • * i« I""" ii wrii incorporated into the Division's action as factually true. While Weilzel inij I• • 
have a valid dclense al a hearing HA ih< inenis, on tin1, appeal only the facts and inferences most 
favorable to the Division are allowed in considering the appn ipi latentss «>< i dismissal with 
( " ! , | l " l ( J l i l". 
I I aw* . ; * * - • - -".^  *TS divisions, including the 
I)j vi -i .ire ultimate 1) guided by the legislative finding;, - . . i AH CODE 
The Legislature iinas that many businesses and occupations 
in the state have a pronounced physical and economic impact in 
the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state. The 
Legislature further finds that while the overall impact is generally 
beneficial to the public, the potential for harm and injury 
frequently warrants intervention by state government. 
5 
1 lie11 .('j-rXtltiirc declares that it is appropriate and necessary for 
state government to protect its citizens from harmful and injurious 
HI h by persons offering or providing essential or necessary goods 
and services to the general public. The Legislature further declares 
that business regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory 
However, the general public interest must be recognized and 
regarded as the primary purpose of all regulation by state 
government (Emphasis added). 
- \* ir that the Division has a legislative mandate to proitx I iiir (iiililn wcILm: 
i , »„.... -?^ciplinar\ action against licensees ioi 
unprofessioiM . » auci. Mich ^ w.i > i^u.axj. ayj. • * * in (lie case below. UTAH CODE 
' 5&-M0K/> ^nerifies that: 
iiie division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant 
ana may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on 
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act 
upon the license of any licensee in any of the following cases: 
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under this title; 
13. The first issue to k i i HSHICR1 h! w> p1 is whether the rule invoked by the 
Division, in the ative proceeding exceed*-* the .». O\K „. jr, . diking authority 
ami vliclii' P .-1 .!•" * with the statute defining "unpnSessional conduct i ly means of 
* • * * < ODEAINN. §38 ; . • .. authorized the Division K-exercise 
c e r t a - n p 0 w e r s > including: 
• j | i e following duties, functions, and responsibilities of *h<* 
division shall be performed by the division with 'the collahorai • 
and assistance of the appropriate board 
(5) defining unprofessional conduct, by rule, to supplement the 
definitions under this chapter or other licensing chapters; 
14 Ihemlt1 WI»„J, imi/jd ,,;,)', .:h;iij;nt aitli, violating is UTAH ADMIN. R156-1-502 
providing, among other things: 
i 11 (professional conduct" includes: 
6 
(1) surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory 
authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the 
same occupation or profession while an investigation or inquiry 
into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in 
progress or after a charging document has been filed against the 
applicant or licensee alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct; 
I 1 he gene nil licensing statute defining "unprofessional conduct", UTAH CODE 
ANN. §58-1-501(2), also invoked by - i:~r brought against Weitzel, 
states in part: 
"Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or 
applicant, that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title 
or under any rule adopted under this title and includes: 
(d) engaging in conduct that results, in disciplinary action, 
including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or 
revocation, by any other licensing or regulatory authority having 
jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation 
or profession if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds 
for denial of licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section 
58-1-401; 
(k) verbally, physically, mentally, or sexir 
exploiting any person through conduct connected wu* 
licensee's practice under this title or otherwise facilitate ^ «ie 
licensee's license; 
If Tt is necessary4 , * " rv •* - onsider both the statute andjfce 
pttr defining "unprofessional conduct" together,since the ^ L . , ^ . -M.iMishes ilic piM,n"etcrs by 
" i ", V U JIII.IK the legitimacy of the rale, 'ilii;- review must commence witli ;• \ -. , tyu Vion, 
that the rule is clothed with tin: }tir„Mji nHioii lliii! if is both valid and reasonable. Eaton Kenwqy, 
Inc. v. Editing Division, 906 P. 2d 882 (Utah 1995). 
below determined that" • i- 5'>8-l-501(2)andR15()»l "j0i(i I ci i 
unambiguous. - .. \ - • " i r ? n " ilM' imiinplcs o* <t'»-i.«v construction to -
ascertain the meaning of these provisions," (Ordei, p I "11 11 n entered 
7 
this roundabout side-by-side, but emerged in exactly opposite directions as to meaning and 
import of the statute and rule. 
In construing these subsections, we apply long-standing 
rules of statutory construction. "This court's primary objective in 
construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent. 
The plain language of a statute is generally the best indication of 
that intent. Therefore, "where the statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning 
to divine legislative intent." The plain language of a statute is to be 
read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with 
other provisions in the same statute and "with other statutes under 
the same and related chapters." Furthermore, where possible "we . 
. . construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their 
terms. Most pertinent here is the rule that a statute dealing 
specifically with a particular issue prevails over a more general 
statute that arguably also deals with the same issue, (citations 
omitted). Lyon v. Burton, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 2000). 
18. A consideration of the mandate given to the Department of Commerce and the 
Division clearly shows the legislative intent that the primary function of the department and its 
divisions be the protection to the citizens of the State of Utah. However, it is not necessary for 
this tribunal to mine the intentions of the legislature regarding the statute and rule in question 
since the plain language of the statute would include the action brought by the Division, and the 
rule clearly fits within the framework of the statute which spawned it. 
19. A fair reading of plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-501(2) reflects that it 
is not intended to be all inclusive, and does not purport to exclude unprofessional conduct which 
might fall within its broad guidelines although not specifically pointed out by illustration or 
example. The inclusory intent of the statutory definition to cover more than the enumerations of 
subsection (2)(a-k) is shown by the preamble to subsection (2): '"Unprofessional conduct' means 
conduct... that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule adopted 
under this title and includes:" 
20. The general licensing act referenced in the immediately preceding paragraph then 
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proceeds to list certain areas of conduct which the legislature considers to generally and 
generically constitute unprofessional conduct, sufficiently broad to be applicable across the over 
130,000 licensees in 185 diverse classifications of occupations and professions currently being 
regulated by the Division under the authority granted by the legislature under the general 
licensing act and the profession specific licensing acts. 
21. Subsection (d) under the definition of "unprofessional conduct" in the general 
licensing act addresses the issue presented in the case at bar. A fair reading, exclusive of the 
items set off between commas, reads: "engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action... 
by any other licensing or regulatory authority having jurisdiction... if the conduct would, in this 
state, constitute grounds for denial of licensure or disciplinary proceedings..." 
22. In between the commas in subsection (d) the legislature inserted examples of 
various forms of disciplinary action "... including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, 
suspension, or revocation..." The use of the word "including" - for the second time in pertinent 
sections of subsection (2) defining "unprofessional conduct" - indicates that the examples of 
disciplinary action are not exclusive but merely illustrate the range of discipline available. The 
listing by the legislature appears to be an ascending scale of punitive results, starting with a 
reprimand and ending with revocation. 
23. The surrender of a license for sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation of a 
patient, under the terms and conditions of the California stipulation which contains the 
undisputed facts in this matter for the purpose of entertaining a motion to dismiss, would appear 
to fit nicely within the list of deadly sins, perfiaps between probation and suspension on the high 
end of the Utah disciplinary scale. 
24. Whether or not the allegations admitted to by Weitzel in his California stipulation 
would constitute actionable conduct subjecting him to discipline in Utah is addressed by the 
legislature in §58-l-501(2)(k), which determines that "unprofessional conduct" includes: "... 
sexually abusing or exploiting any person through conduct connected with the licensee's practice" 
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under this title " The licensing statute directly addresses the exact conduct which resulted in 
Weitzel losing his California license and which was undisputed for the purpose of the motion to 
dismiss. 
25. An apparent determination by the ALJ that the conduct engaged in by Weitzel in 
California did not rise to the level of activity which would be punishable in Utah was an 
unwarranted finding under a motion proceeding requiring that the facts be construed most 
favorably for the Division. The issue of the nature and degree of Weitzel's California conduct is 
one to be addressed at a hearing, and one which must be based upon evidence and testimony 
adduced at a hearing. 
26. The required elements of proof established by §58-1 -501 (2)(d) and the allegations 
of the Division's Petition are: 
a. Statute: engaging in conduct resulting in disciplinary action - Petition: Weitzel 
was charged with serious unprofessional conduct by the California authorities. 
b. Statute: by a licensing authority having jurisdiction - Petition: Weitzel was 
licensed by California at the time that state sought to suspend or revoke his license to practice. 
c. Statute: if the conduct would warrant disciplinary action in Utah - Petition: 
surrender of his license under the conditions set out in the California action and stipulation would 
clearly fall within the statute. The activity charged by California would also constitute 
unprofessional conduct in Utah under subsection (k) of §58-1-501(2). 
27. Weitzel's surrender of his license for acts of unprofessional conduct in a sister 
state would place him four-square within the statutory definition of "unprofessional conduct" in 
the State of Utah. The next issue to be determined on this appeal is whether the definition 
contained in the rule, under which the Division charges that Weitzel's conduct also falls, 
constitutes impermissible and therefore unenforceable rulemaking by the Division. 
28. The challenged rule, UTAH ADMIN. Rl 56-1 -502(1), provides that the definition of 
"unprofessional conduct" incorporates "surrendering, licensure... after a charging document has 
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been filed against the . . . licensee alleging unprofessional.. conduct " The undisputed facts 
in this case clearly place Weitzel in the grasp of this rule, if it is enforceable. 
29. The Division is authorized by UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-203(5) to adopt rules to 
supplement the definitions of unprofessional conduct, regardless of whether the definitions are 
contained in the general licensing statutes or the profession specific licensing statutes. In his 
opinion the learned ALJ defined "supplement", as used in the licensing act at §58-1-203(5), as a 
noun (Order, p. 16). However, in the statute authorizing rules, the phrase of "to supplement the 
definitions" it is used as a verb, with the meaning of "to add to; to make more complete by an 
additional part." Webster's New Concise Dictionary (1984 ed.). 
30. It is not suggested that the legislature has given the Division free rein to rewrite 
the laws given it to enforce. However, within the framework of the regulatory statutes, the 
Division has been authorized to utilize its expertise and that of its boards, made up of 
professionals in the various regulated fields, to define "unprofessional conduct". In reviewing 
the definition at issue in this case, it is not possible to uphold a finding that such an addition was 
not contemplated by the legislature. 
31. The case at bar presents more than a simple surrender of a license. Weitzel did 
not merely walk away from his California license without pressure and of his own accord and 
volition. Instead, with representation of counsel, Weitzel cut a deal stripping him of his right to 
practice medicine in that state to close the disciplinary action pending. As part of the bargain 
Weitzel agreed that should he attempt to obtain another medical license in California, such an 
action would be considered the same as seeking a reinstatement after license revocation with all 
of the charges made against him in the California action taken as admitted by Weitzel. 
32. Under the facts required to be accepted as true in this matter, Weitzel engaged in 
conduct in California which, if committed in Utah, could have opened him up to severe 
disciplinary action. The licensing act reasonably seeks to put Utah in the position of sister states 
when considering the import of conduct committed in the foreign jurisdiction upon a Utah 
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license. The proscribed nature of the admitted conduct is the same in either state, and the range 
of punishment appears to be the same in either state. 
33. The State of Utah has at least as much right to protect its citizens as does the State 
of California, and Utah is reasonably entitled to place itself in the same position as California 
when dealing with exported problem practitioners from that state. The California surrender of 
licensure was not a passive act by Weitzel, but possessed all of the trappings and accouterments 
of a plea bargain whereby he achieved the best results under the circumstances. The Division 
should not and, under its legislative delegation, cannot allow itself to become a safe harbor for 
miscreants from other jurisdictions choosing flight over fight. 
34. These conclusions of law are based upon the required conclusory acceptance of 
only the facts most favorable to the Division, and should not be construed as indicating that 
Weitzel is denied any right to present mitigating evidence and affirmative matters to offset the 
presumption created by the California surrender under charges. These conclusions should also 
not be taken as indicating any opinion as to whether the State of Utah must or should follow the 
example of the State of California in determining that WeitzeFs conduct warranted the loss of his 
license to practice medicine. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
ORDERED that the Order on Motion to Dismiss heretofore entered dismissing this 
action with prejudice should be, and is hereby, reversed and this matter is remanded to the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for further proceedings on the merits. 
Dated this the / % 2 g day of May, 2000. 
MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counse 
Utah Department of Commerce 
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APPENDIX E - PETITION FOR REVIEW 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118) 
JOHN WARREN MAY (Bar No. 7412) 
DARIEN ALCORN (Bar No. 8712) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ROBERT A. WEITZEL, M.D. : 
Petitioner, : PETITION FOR REVIEW 
vs. : Subject To Assignment To The. 
Court Of Appeals 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH DOPLCaseNo. 99-71 
Respondent, 
Notice is hereby given that Robert A. Weitzel, petitioner, petitions the Utah Supreme 
Court, subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals, to review the Order of the respondent made 
in this matter on the 16th day of May, 2000, and attached hereto. 
This petition seeks review of the entire Order. 
Petitioner requests the court to direct the respondent to prepare and certify to the court its 
entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter. 
Dated this / O day of June, 2000. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
B y C Z ^ 
PETER STII 
JOHN WARREN MAY 
DARIEN ALCORN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
